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CASENOTES 141 
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-CONDITIONAL DELIVERY-
ADMISSlBILITY OF P AROL EVIDENCE TO SHOW CONDITION 
SUBSEQUENT UNDER SECTION 16 OF N.I.L.-ADMISSI-
BIUTY OF P AROL EVIDENCE TO SHOW COLLATERAL 
AGREEMENT 
An itinerant carnival worker gave a note to a used car dealer 
for the balance of the price of a house trailer. The dealer in-
dorsed the note to plaintiff who sued the dealer as indorser upon 
default of the carnival worker. The dealer offered evidence that 
before taking the note he made an oral agreement with the man-
ager of plaintiff's branch office to indorse the note with recourse 
on condition that plaintiff would return the trailer to his car lot 
before requiring him to pay the note. This agreement was made 
to facilitate acceptance of the note by plaintiff's home office. 
Plaintiff did not return the trailer. Held: the oral agreement to 
return the trailer was a condition subsequent and inadmissible 
under the parol evidence rule.1 
Section 16 of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides that 
"every contract on a negotiable instrument is incomplete and re-
vocable until delivery of the instrument for the purpose of giving 
effect thereto. As between immediate parties ... the delivery may 
be shown to have been conditional or for a special purpose only, 
l Securities Acceptance Corp. v. Blake, 157 Neb. 848, 62 N.W.2d 132 
(1954). 
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and not for the purpose of transferring the property of the in-
strument."2 
It is generally held that parol evidence is admissible to show 
delivery on a condition precedent, i.e., one which must be per-
formed before the manually delivered instrument is a legally en-
forceable obligation.3 Also, it is a widely stated rule that a con-
dition subsequent, i.e., one whose occurrence or failure to occur 
will relieve the parties from an agreement which they intended to 
be legally binding, may not be shown.4 
Although the distinction between these two principles is clear 
as a matter of theory, their factual application has been confused. 
Evidence which would clearly appear to be admissible to show a 
condition precedent has been excluded.5 Conversely, evidence has 
been admitted which seemingly should not have been on the basis 
of the distinction between the two principles.6 The anomalies 
shown by these cases indicate that the distinction is more alive 
in theory than in fact. Further, a change in the language in 
which the condition is stated is all that is needed to turn one type 
of condition into the other.7 
2Neb. Rev. Stat. § 62-116 (Reissue 1950). 
3 3 Williston, Contracts § 666A (1936); 3 Corbin, Contracts § 628 
( 1951); Elson v. Jones, 42 Idaho 349, 245 Pac. 95 (1926); Restatement, 
Contracts § 250(a) (1932). 
4 3 Williston, Contracts § 667 (1936); Restatement. Contracts §§ 250 
(b), 254 (1932); Lowe v. Copeland, 125 Cal. App. 315, 13 P.2d 522 
11932). 
G Hurt v. Ford, 142 :Mo. 283, 44 S.W. 228 (1897) (condition that 
others sign was not admitted). But compare Towle-Jamieson Investment 
Co. v. Brannan, 165 :Minn. 82, 205 N.W. 699 (1925) (such evidence was 
admitted). Difficulty in many cases arises through failure to distinguish 
between conditional delivery and conditions precedent to the performance 
of a contract already made. For a discussion of the relational nature of 
these definitions see 3 Corbin, Contracts §§ 589, 739 (1951); 3 Williston, 
Contracts § 667A (1936). Barret v. Clarke, 226 Ky. 109, 9 S.W.2d 1091 
(1928), involved a condition which was precedent to payment and should 
have been admissible in evidence but was held a condition subsequent and 
inadmissible because subsequent to the execution of the contract. 
13 In Paulson v. Boyd, 137 Wis. 241, 118 N.W. 841 (1908), the maker 
gave the note to payee for purchase of stock. If the stock did not return 
the maker the amount of the note in 18 months, he had the right to re-
turn the stock and have the note cancelled. The majority held this a 
condition subsequent; three dissenting judges called it a condition sub-
sequent-which it would appear to be by the commonly used though 
questioned definition, supra note 5. See also Kuhn v. Simmons, 126 Me. 
434, 139 Atl. 474 (1927); 9 Wigmore, Evidence§ 2444 n.6 (3d ed. 1940) 
for an extensive collection of these cases. 
7 Note, 13 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 248, 251 (1941). 
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Cases decided since the adoption of the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law have differed on the question of whether Section 16 
recognizes the distinction between conditions precedent and sub-
sequent, some courts declaring that it merely embodies the com-
mon law rule.8 In view of the narrow academic distinction be-
tween the conditions, the preferable holding has been that Section 
16 permits evidence of either type to be shown.9 When, as in 
the instant case, the instrument has not been unreservedly de-
livered, the construction placed on Section 16 by these latter cases 
should be followed. 
By its definition a condition subsequent arises when the pa~;­
ties agree to be legally bound until the duty is relieved by occur-
rence or nonoccurrence of a specified event. It is difficult to see 
how a party can intend his engagement to be legally binding in 
the sense that it is an absolute, unconditional and unqualified 
commitment to liability when he orally conditions his engage-
ment at the time. Even though the condition be labeled "sub-
sequent," it would ordinarily be the intention of the parties to the 
instrument that delivery be provisional with no thought to the 
manner in which the condition was stated.10 
Although in the instant case the court held the evidence 
showed a conditional delivery based upon a condition subsequent 
and disallowed it for that reason, it would appear that the case 
should have been decided not on the basis of a conditional delivery 
under Section 16 but rather on the basis of a showing by the 
parties of their complete agreement under the parol evidence 
rule. A strong position has been taken by treatise writers that 
a proper application of the parol evidence rule would alleviate 
such academic arguments as that found in the instant case. By 
this test neither a condition precedent nor a condition subsequent 
would gain precedence for admissibility into evidence solely on 
the basis of its label.11 These writers take the position that the 
s Skogberg v. Hjelm, 211 l\Iinn. 392, 1 N.W.2d 599 (1941); J.B. 
Colt Co. v. Gregor, 328 l\Io. 1216, 44 S.W.2d 2 (1931); Continental Trust 
Co. v. Witt, 139 Va. 458, 124 S.E. 265 (1924). 
9 Goldsmith v. Parsons, 182 La. 122, 161 So. 175 (1935); Rule v. 
Connealy, 61 N.D. 57, 237 N.W. 197 (1931); Beutel's Brannan, Negoti-
able Instruments Law 378 (7th ed. 1948) and cases collected. It is 
suggested that the ambiguity in Section 16 of the N.I.L. should be re-
solved to reach this result by construing "not for the purpose of trans-
ferring property therein" to modify only "for a special purpose" so that 
"conditional" would remain unmodified and inclusive of both types of 
condition. It is to be noted that there is a variation in the Nebraska 
statute since there is no comma between "conditional" and "or." 
io Beutel's Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law 377 (7th ed. 1948). 
11 3 Corbin, Contracts §§ 589, 576, 746, 739 (1951). 
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courts have made deep inroads upon the parol evidence rule, and 
that stare decisis has compounded misinterpretation.12 Thousands 
of cases have declared parol evidence inadmissible to vary or con-
tradict the terms of a written contract. This is stated in the 
form of a rule of evidence excluding certain testimony. There is 
no rule of evidence that excludes testimony of what happened 
in the past until the new agreement of the parties is established. 
And even after it is established, there is still no such rule exclud-
ing evidence except in so far as it is immaterial even if true.13 
The parol evidence rule merely states the obvious, i.e., that after 
the parties have integrated their whole agreement on a subject, 
any evidence, either parol or written, is immaterial.14 It is a 
rule of substantive contract law and not of evidence.15 
In many cases it is obvious that the court has in fact con-
sidered the testimony, weighed it, found a complete integration 
in writing and then justified its position by repeating the parol 
evidence rule to the effect that such testimony is inadmissible to 
vary or contradict the writing.16 Such an oral agreement must 
nearly always have some effect on the interpretation of a part 
of the contract that is in writing, and it is unsatisfactory to state 
that it is not to be shown only because it varies the writing. Such 
evidence may clearly show that there was no agreement to sub-
stitute the written instrument for the particular oral agreement. 
Courts have furthered the improper use of the parol evidence 
rule by holding the writing to be the only competent evidence 
of the parties' agreement.17 The writing cannot prove its own 
completeness and accuracy.18 Thus the very testimony that the 
rule is supposed to exclude is frequently, if not always, necessary 
before the court can determine that the parties have agreed upon 
the writing as a complete and accurate statement of their agree-
ment. 
Such usage of the parol evidence rule has led to decisions 
12 3 id. § 582; 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2430(3) (3d ed. 1940). 
13 3 Corbin, Contracts § 576 (1951). 
14 3 id. §§ 573, 576, 582; 9 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2443, 2445 (3d ed. 
1940). It is of course always competent to supplant a contract with a 
subsequent agreement. See 3 Corbin Contracts § 574 (1951). 
rn 3 Corbin, Contracts § 573 (1951). 
113 3 id. § 582. See also § 573 for a discussion of the different bases 
on which a court may reach its decision in applying the parol evidence 
rule. 
17 The principal case is decidedly in accord. 
1s 3 Corbin, Contracts § 582 (1951); 9 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2431, 
2400(5) (1940). 
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which are virtually useless as precedents, has deterred counsel 
from offering testimony that was admissible for many purposes, 
and more important, has caused courts to refuse to hear testi-
mony that should have been heard.19 Although one of the factors 
behind this application of the parol evidence rule as a rule of 
evidence is the prevention of fraud, there would appear to be no 
reason why this consideration should bar the admission of evi-
dence, its plainly stated consideration as a matter of law by the 
court, and its ultimate submission to the jury if it is of sufficient 
weight as a matter of law.20 
In the case of negotiable paper, especially between indorsers, 
the indorsement alone is seldom a complete integration,21 and it 
was not in this case.22 The character of the writing, the sur-
rounding circumstances, and the testimony of other witnesses 
should have been admitted and weighed by the court. 
Charles H. Beatty* 
10 3 Corbin, Contracts § 582 (1951). 
20 Ibid. See also 9 Wigmore, Evidence§ 2430(2) (3d ed. 1940). 
21 3 Corbin, Contracts § 587 (1951); 9 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2443, 
2445 (3d ed. 1940). 
22 The indorsement in the instant case contained a waiver of demand 
and presentment. It then stated "payment guaranteed." Brief for Ap-
pellees No. 33430, p. 4, Securities Acceptance Corp. v. Blake, 157 Neb. 
848, 62 N.W.2d 132 (1954); cf. Randles v. Gully, 128 Okla. 220, 262 
Pac. 201 (1927). 
':' Currently serving in the armed forces. 
